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Masaryk University and CSIRT-MU
Masaryk University, Brno
2nd largest university in the Czech Republic.
~45,000 students, ~5,000 staff.
~15,000 hosts (public IPs) online every day.
CSIRT-MU
In charge of university network security since 2009.
Accredited by European Trusted Introducer in 2011.
~3 FTE ⇒ automatization.
Intrusion detection is one of key services.
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Intrusion Detection at Masaryk University
NetFlow-based
~35 software (1 GE) or hardware accelerated (10 GE)
stand-alone probes at important links.
Several NfSen collectors for data storage.
Wealth of in-house developed detection tools.
Other
Low- and high-interaction honeypots.
Integrated logging system based on Syslog.
External data sources: Shadowserver and Team Cymru
reports.
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Intrusion Detection at Masaryk University contd.
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In-house Developed Tools
Our tools detects:
live hosts and missing DNS reverse entries,
port scans,
embedded botnets (presented at FloCon 2011),
network address translators,
spamming hosts,
changes in RTT of selected servers,
bruteforce attacks.
In progress: analytic tool of phishing incidents.
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Part II
Bruteforcing: State of the Art
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Bruteforce SSH Attacks: Introduction
Repetitive online password guessing.
Ubiquitous on the Internet.
Humans tend to select week passwords.
Still a threat (stepping stones, data leakage, ...).
Common attack types – 1:1, 1:N, M:1, and M:N.
Traditionally detected at the host level (1:1 and M:1).
Host-based detection may miss large attacks (1:N and M:N).
Network-based detection promises to protect devices that do
not protect themselves (such as embedded devices, routers).
Drasar, Vykopal Bruteforcing in the Shadows – Evading Automated Detection 8 / 22
Diversion: Datasets & Data Sources
Detection methods are developed using various datasets, but
academia uses data sets that do not reflect the reality.
Datasets do not contain current attacks ⇒ old.
Data are from limited topologies and small number of
networked hosts ⇒ small-scaled.
They are not (sufficiently) annotated, leave you on your own.
Favor volume-visible attacks such as scans, floods, DoS, etc.
May or may not contain stealth attacks.
Security research bent on detecting attacks present in
datasets only.
We prefer real examples from daily life of CSIRT-MU.
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Bruteforce SSH Attacks: Detection
Typical brute force SSH attack scenario:
Uses common SSH port.
Repetitive password guessing generates similar flows in terms
of volume and time.
Small and short flows indicates unsuccessful attempts.
It is often preceded by port scanning.
One attacker aims at several (many) hosts.
Attacks continue even after black-holing.
We believe it is the similar case for other services/protocols:
Telnet, RDP, web authentication, etc.
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Increasing Effectiveness of Detection
Know your network. Is it server or client?
Have the attackers scanned our network already?
Do they access honeypots?
Are they from untrusted autonomous system?
Use external data sources but be careful!
Drasar, Vykopal Bruteforcing in the Shadows – Evading Automated Detection 11 / 22
Part III
Evading Automated Detection
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Black-box Probing
Typical bruteforce attack [THC-Hydra, . . . ]
Attacking as much as it is possible.
Using predefined attacks per time frame.
Sophisticated bruteforce attack [Ncrack]
Adaptive lowering of attack attempts per time frame to get
under network thresholds.
Threshold detection is not that hard.
Especially when there is an imminent blocking of attackers.
Possible if attacker controls more hosts.
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Random Delays
Typical bruteforce attack [THC-Hydra, . . . ]
Fixed attempts per time frame.
Zero or fixed interval between attempts.
Sophisticated bruteforce attack [Ncrack]
Simulation of real traffic by inserting random delays between
attack attempts.
Random delays cause variations in the number of attempts
per timeframe.
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Random Delays: Illustration
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Random Delays: Illustration contd.
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Flow Stretching
Typical bruteforce attack [THC-Hydra, Ncrack, . . . ]
Exchanging bare minimum of data needed for authentication
attempt.
Sophisticated bruteforce attack [?]
Flow-wise the volume and duration are the only difference
between successful and failed authentication.
Exploiting protocol design to mimic successful authentication
by increasing volume and duration.
SSH, RDP, HTTP and probably others.
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Flow Stretching: Illustration
Non-stretched flows
Duration Protocol Src IP:Src Port Dst IP:Port Packets Bytes
1.310 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49297 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 12 1197
0.269 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49320 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 11 1157
0.436 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49329 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 11 1157
0.196 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49358 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 11 1173
0.155 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49308 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 11 1157
0.273 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49318 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 11 1157
0.270 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49343 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 11 1157
0.259 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49344 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 11 1157
0.206 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49355 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 11 1173
0.190 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49362 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 11 1157
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Flow Stretching: Illustration contd.
Stretched flows
Duration Protocol Src IP:Src Port Dst IP:Port Packets Bytes
8.157 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49368 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 142 44441
5.501 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49379 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 99 30389
14.227 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49367 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 239 76837
6.722 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49369 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 119 36981
5.429 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49372 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 98 29865
18.184 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49375 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 302 97593
2.239 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49387 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 47 13125
1.304 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49380 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 32 8033
23.320 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49374 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 384 124865
1.798 TCP 147.251.AA.BB:49386 -> 147.251.CC.DD:22 40 10737
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Search for a Remedy
Correlation with (sys)log information?
Bigger restrictiveness?
More sophisticated flow analyses?
Open problem. . .
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Summary
Brute-force (SSH) attacks are still a threat.
It is possible to detect them by NetFlow analysis.
Defenders are prepared for
simple attacks and simple attackers.
Many NetFlow detection methods can be easily evaded.
Limitations of NetFlow – how to overcome them?
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Questions & Answers
Martin Drašar
Jan Vykopal
{drasar|vykopal}@ics.muni.cz
Project CYBER
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